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Abstract
We study approachability theory in the presence of constraints. Given a repeated
game with vector payoffs, we characterize the pairs of sets (A,D) in the payoff space
such that Player 1 can guarantee that the long-run average payoff converges to the set
A, while the average payoff always remains in D.
1 Introduction
Approachability theory, which was first introduced in Blackwell (1956), is an extension
of the theory of zero-sum strategic-form games to the situation where the outcome
is multidimensional. In a two-player repeated game in which the outcome is an n-
dimensional vector, a target set A in Rn is approachable by Player 1 if he has a strategy
that ensures that the long-run average payoff converges to the set, whatever strategy
Player 2 uses. Blackwell (1956) provided a geometric condition that ensures that a set is
approachable by Player 1. Hou (1971) and Spinat (2002) completed the characterization
of approachable sets, by showing that a set is approachable only if it contains a set that
satisfies Blackwell’s geometric condition.
Approachability theory was used to study no regret with partial monitoring (see
Perchet (2009), Lehrer and Solan (2016), and Perchet and Quincampoix (2014)). In fact,
approachability is equivalent to regret minimization and calibration (see Cesa-Bianchi
and Lugosi (2006) and Perchet (2014)). The theory was also used to study continuous-
time network flows with capacity and unknown demand (Bauso et al. (2010)), production-
inventory problems in both discrete and continuous-time (Khmelnitsky and Tzur (2004)),
and to construct normal numbers (Lehrer (2004)). The geometric principle that lies be-
hind approachability theory has been studied by Lehrer (2002), the rate of convergence
to the target set was studied in Mannor and Perchet (2013), and variants of the basic
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notion of approachability have been studied by, e.g., Vieille (1992), Lehrer and Solan
(2009), Shani and Solan (2014), Mannor et al. (2014), and Bauso et al. (2015).
In various situations, in addition to having a target set, the player has constraints
that have to be satisfied. For example, an investment firm makes daily investment
decisions and may have various goals, like maximizing the value of its portfolio, keeping
the value of its portfolio higher than the value of other investment firms, and attracting
investors. The firm may also have various constraints, like keeping its Sharpe ratio
above a certain level, or never going bankrupt. A second example concerns fellowships
obtained by students in various universities. In every quarter or semester the student
has to dedicate her time to several activities, like studying and spending time with
friends and family. However, to keep receiving the fellowship, the student must keep
her average grade above a certain level.
Our goal in this paper is to study approachability in the presence of constraints.
Specifically, we consider a two-player repeated game with vector payoffs, and are given
two sets A and D in the payoff space. The set A is the target set that Player 1 would
like to approach, and the set D represents the set of allowable average payoffs: after
any finite history that occurs with positive probability, the average payoff must be in
D. We call this problem approaching A while remaining in D.
If the set A is approachable by Player 1 while remaining in the set D, then necessarily
the set A ∩ D is approachable by Player 1, where A and D are the closures of A and
D. Since the outcome after the first stage must be in D, a second necessary condition
is that Player 1 has a safe action; that is, an action s such that when Player 1 plays s
the outcome is in D, whatever Player 2 plays. Our first result is that when the set D
is open and convex, these two conditions are also sufficient to ensure that the set A is
approachable while remaining in D. We moreover show that the rate of convergence of
the average payoff to the set A in our setup is the same as the rate of convergence given
by Blackwell (1956) or Mannor and Perchet (2013), so that the presence of constraints
does not slow down the rate of convergence to A.
We then study the case that the set D is not convex, provide two sufficient conditions
that guarantee that the set A is approachable while remaining in D, and provide an
example that shows that the conditions are not necessary. This example shows the
difficulty in providing a general characterization of the pairs of sets (A,D) such that A
is approachable by Player 1 while remaining in D.
In Section 2 we define the model, define the concept of approachability while re-
maining in a set, and state and prove our main result. Section 3 is devoted to the case
in which the set D is not convex. Finally, in Section 4 we mention two open problems.
2 The Model and the Main Result
A two-player repeated game with vector-payoffs is a triplet (I, J, U), where I and J
are finite sets of actions for the two players, and U = I × J → Rn is a vector-payoff
matrix. We assume w.l.o.g. that payoffs are nonnegative and bounded by 1, that is
0 ≤ Uk(i, j) ≤ 1 for every i ∈ I, every j ∈ J , and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n. To eliminate trivial
cases we assume that both players have at least two actions: |I| ≥ 2 and |J | ≥ 2.
At every stage t ≥ 1 the two players choose, independently and simultaneously, a
pair of actions (it, jt) ∈ I × J , each one in his action set, which is observed by both
players.1 A finite history of length t is a sequence ht = (i1, j1, i2, j2, · · · , it, jt) ∈ (I×J)t
for some t ≥ 0. The empty history is denoted ∅. We denote by H = ∪∞t=0(I × J)t the
1As in Blackwell (1956), for our results it is sufficient to assume that the players observe the outcome
U(it, jt) at every stage t.
2
set of all finite histories. When ht = (i1, j1, i2, j2, · · · , it, jt) ∈ H and t′ ≤ t we denote
by ht′ = (i1, j1, i2, j2, · · · , it′ , jt′) the prefix of ht of length t′.
We assume perfect recall, and consequently by Kuhn’s Theorem we can restrict
attention to behavior strategies. A (behavior) strategy for Player 1 (resp. Player 2) is
a function σ : H → ∆(I) (resp. τ : H → ∆(J)), where ∆(A) is the space of probability
distributions over A = I, J . We denote by S and T the strategy spaces of the players
1 and 2, respectively.
The set F of feasible payoffs is the convex hull of possible one stage payoffs, that is,
F := conv{U(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ I × J} ⊂ Rn.
The set of infinite plays is H∞ = (I × J)∞. This set, when supplemented with
the sigma-algebra generated by all finite cylinders, is a measure space. Every pair of
strategies (σ, τ) ∈ S×T defines a probability distribution Pσ,τ over H. We denote Eσ,τ
the expectation with respect to this probability distribution.
The average payoff vector up to stage t is
gt :=
1
t
t∑
k=1
U(ik, jk).
Note that for every t ∈ N, the average payoff vector gt is a random variable with values
in Rn, whose distribution is determined by the strategies of both players. When we
wish to calculate the average payoff along a finite history ht we use the notation gt(ht).
Let d(x, y) := ||x− y||2 denote the euclidean distance between the points x and y in
Rn.
Blackwell (1956) defined the concept of approachable sets in repeated games with
vector payoffs. A subset A ∈ Rn is approachable by Player 1 if there exists a strategy
σ ∈ S such that for every  > 0 there exists an integer T such that for every strategy
τ ∈ T of Player 2 we have:
Pσ,τ
[
d(gt, A) < ,∀t ≥ T
]
> 1− .
This paper concerns the concept of approachability with constraints, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 1. Let A and D be two subsets of Rn. The set A is approachable by Player 1
while remaining in the set D if there exists a strategy σ ∈ S such that for every  > 0
there exists an integer T ∈ N such that for every strategy τ ∈ T of Player 2, we have:
Pσ,τ
[
∀t ≥ T, d(gt, A) < 
]
> 1− , (1)
Pσ,τ
[
∀t ≥ 1, gt ∈ D
]
= 1. (2)
Condition (1) ensures that the strategy σ approaches the set A. Condition (2) is
concerned with the constraints: when playing σ, Player 1 guarantees that the sequence
of realized average payoffs always remains in the set D. Our main goal is the char-
acterization of the pairs of sets (A,D) such that A is approachable by Player 1 while
remaining in D.
For every mixed action p ∈ ∆(I) define
R1(p) := {U(p, q) : q ∈ ∆(J)} = conv{U(p, j) : j ∈ J}.
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This is the set of all possible expected outcomes when Player 1 plays the mixed action
p. For every set X in a Euclidean space we denote by X the closure of X.
The following lemma lists two necessary conditions to approaching A while remaining
in D.
Lemma 2. Let A and D be two subsets of Rn. If the set A is approachable by Player 1
while remaining in the set D, then the following two conditions hold.
(C1) The set A ∩D is approachable by Player 1.
(C2) There exists an action s ∈ I such that for every action j ∈ J we have U(s, j) ∈ D.
An action s ∈ I that satisfies condition (C2) is termed a safe action, since it ensures
that the stage payoff is in D.
Proof. We first argue that Condition (C1) is necessary. Suppose that the set A is
approachable by Player 1 while remaining in the set D, and let σ be a strategy for
Player 1 that guarantees that the average payoff converges to A while remaining in
D. By Eq. (1), any accumulation point of the sequence of average payoffs lies in A,
regardless of the strategy used by Player 2. Since the average payoff remains in D, any
accumulation point of the sequence of average payoffs lies in D. Hence any accumulation
point of the sequence of average payoffs lies in the set A∩D, which implies that the set
A ∩D is approachable by Player 1.
We now argue that Condition (C2) is necessary. Denote by s any action that the
strategy σ plays with positive probability at the first stage. Let τ be any strategy
for Player 2 that plays all actions in J with positive probability. Under the strategy
pair (σ, τ) the probability that the action pair (s, j) is played is positive, and therefore
Eq. (2) implies that U(s, j) ∈ D.
Our main result is a characterization of the pairs of sets (A,D) such that the set
A is approachable while remaining in D, and it is valid whenever the set D is open
and convex. Convexity is a natural assumption, as often constraints have the form of
linear inequalities. The requirement that the set D is open means that these inequalities
should be strict. The characterization states that when the set D is open and convex,
Conditions (C1) and (C2) are also sufficient.
Theorem 3. Let A be a subset of Rn and let D be an open and convex subset of Rn.
Player 1 can approach A while remaining in D if and only if Conditions (C1) and (C2)
hold.
We note that Condition (C2), together with the assumption that D is convex, implies
that R1(s) ⊆ D. Because both R1(s) and F \ D are closed, we have δ := d(F \
D,R1(s)) > 0.
The following example shows that when D is not open, Conditions (C1) and (C2)
are not sufficient to imply that A is approachable while remaining in D.
Example 4. Consider the game that is depicted in Figure 1 with A = (0, 0) and D =
{(x, y) ∈ R2 : x ≥ 0}. For convenience we consider, in this example and in the following
ones, payoffs that do not necessarily belong to the interval [0, 1].
The set A = A ∩ D is approachable by Player 1, for example, by the stationary
strategy [ 12 (B1),
1
2 (B2)], and therefore Condition (C1) holds. The action T is a safe
action for Player 1, and therefore Condition (C2) holds.
We argue that the set A is not approachable by Player 1 while remaining in D.
Indeed, to approach A Player 1 has to play one of the actions B1 and B2 at least once
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L R
T (0, 1) (0, 1)
B1 (1, 0) (−1, 0)
B2 (−1, 0) (1, 0)
1
1−1
D
A
x
y
Figure 1: The payoff matrix in Example 4 and the payoff space.
(in fact, with probability 1 he should play these action infinitely often). Suppose that
Player 2 plays the stationary strategy [ 12 (L),
1
2 (R)]. Then in the first stage in which
Player 1 plays B1 or B2, there is a probability
1
2 that the outcome is (−1, 0), in which
case the first coordinate of the average payoff is negative, so that the average payoff is
not in D.
Example 11 below shows that when D is not convex, Conditions (C1) and (C2) are
not sufficient to imply that A is approachable while remaining in D.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.
2.1 B-Sets and Blackwell’s Characterization of Approachable
Sets
Blackwell (1956) provided a geometric characterization for approachable sets (without
constraints). The basic concept that Blackwell used was that of B-sets. In this subsec-
tion we review the definition of B-sets and Blackwell’s characterization.
A hyperplane in Rn is any set of the form H := {x ∈ Rn : ∑nk=1 αkxk = β}, where
α1, · · · , αk, β ∈ R. For every hyperplaneH we denote byH+ := {x ∈ Rn : ∑nk=1 αkxk ≥
β} and H− := {x ∈ Rn : ∑nk=1 αkxk ≤ β}. These are the two half-spaces defined by H.
Definition 5. A set A ⊂ Rn is a B-set for Player 1 if for every point x ∈ F \ A
there exists a point y ∈ A and a mixed action p ∈ ∆(I) such that (a) y minimizes the
distance to x among the points in A, and (b) the hyperplane H that is (i) perpendicular
to the line that connects x to y and (ii) passes through y, separates x from R1(p), that
is, x ∈ H− and R1(p) ⊆ H+, or x ∈ H+ and R1(p) ⊆ H−.
Blackwell (1956) proved that every B-set is approachable. Hou (1971) and Spinat
(2002) proved that every approachable set contains a B-set.
In addition, for every B-set A for Player 1 Blackwell identified a strategy for Player 1
that guarantees that the average payoff converges to A at a rate of O( 1√
t
), where t is
the number of stages played so far; that is, there is a strategy σ for Player 1 such that
for every ε > 0 there is a constant c > 0 such that for every strategy τ of Player 2 and
every t ∈ N,
Pσ,τ [d(gt, A) <
c√
t
] ≥ 1− ε, (3)
see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), Remark 7.7 and Exercise 7.23.
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2.2 A definition of a strategy σ∗.
We now define a strategy σ∗ for Player 1 that, as will be shown later, approaches A
while remaining in D. This strategy is based on two components: a strategy σ̂ that
approaches the set A∩D, and a set H∗ of finite histories that we now define. Roughly,
the strategy σ∗ follows the strategy σ̂ that approaches the set A∩D, but whenever the
average payoff gets close to the boundary of D, it plays the safe action, ensuring that
the average payoff gets farther away from the boundary.
Let H∗ ⊆ H be the set of all finite histories ht ∈ H that satisfy d(gt(ht), F \D) ≤ 3t .
We also add the empty history ∅ to H∗. Thus, the complement H \ H∗ contains all
finite histories ht ∈ H that satisfy d(gt(ht), F \ D) > 3t . This implies that whatever
Player 1 plays after a history ht 6∈ H∗, the average payoff after stage t+ 1 will be in D.
For every finite history ht ∈ H denote by ϕ(ht) the part of ht that is played after
stages t′ such that ht′ /∈ H∗. Formally, we define ϕ recursively as follows.
ϕ(∅) := ∅, (4)
ϕ(ht, it+1, jt+1) :=
{
ϕ(ht) if ht ∈ H∗,
ϕ(ht) ◦ (it+1, jt+1) if ht 6∈ H∗, (5)
where ϕ(ht)◦ (it+1, jt+1) is the concatenation of the finite history ϕ(ht) with the action
pair (it+1, jt+1).
We turn to the definition of the strategy σ∗. Let σ∗ be the strategy of Player 1
that plays the safe action s whenever ht ∈ H∗, and plays the strategy that approaches
A∩D whenever ht 6∈ H∗, ignoring the stages that were played after subhistories in H∗.
Formally,
σ∗(ht) :=
{
s if ht ∈ H∗,
σ̂(ϕ(ht)) if ht 6∈ H∗.
We will prove that the strategy σ∗ approaches A while remaining in D. This will be
done in four steps.
1. In Lemma 6 we prove that when Player 1 plays σ∗ the average payoff always
remains in D, whatever Player 2 plays.
2. In Lemma 7 we prove that the frequency of stages in which σ∗ plays the safe action
goes to 0.
3. In Lemma 8 we prove a geometric inequality used in the proof of Lemma 7.
4. In Lemma 9 we prove that the strategy σ∗ approaches the set A.
Lemma 6. For any strategy τ of player 2, we have:
Pσ∗,τ [∃t ≥ 1, gt ∈ D] = 0.
The properties that are needed to prove Lemma 6 are that (a) after histories in H∗
the strategy σ∗ plays a safe action s and (b) the set D is convex.
Proof. Fix a strategy τ of Player 2. For every finite history ht ∈ H denote by Pσ,τ (ht)
the probability that under the strategy pair (σ, τ) the realized history of length t is ht.
We will prove by induction on t that for every history ht ∈ H that satisfies Pσ,τ (ht) > 0
we have gt(ht) ∈ D.
Since at the first stage the strategy σ plays a safe action, the claim holds for t = 1.
Assume then by induction that the claim holds for t − 1, and let ht be a history of
length t with Pσ,τ (ht) > 0. In particular, ht−1, the prefix of ht of length t− 1, satisfies
Pσ,τ (ht−1) > 0, and consequently by the induction hypothesis we have gt−1(ht−1) ∈ D.
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If ht−1 ∈ H∗ then at stage t the strategy σ plays a safe action. Since the set D is
convex, since gt−1(ht−1) ∈ D, and since R1(s) ⊆ D, it follows that gt(ht) ∈ D.
If ht−1 6∈ H∗ then d(gt−1(ht−1), F \D) > 3t−1 . Because payoffs are bounded by 1,
we have that d(gt−1(ht−1), gt(ht)) ≤ 2t . This implies that d(gt(ht), F \D) > 0, so that
gt(ht) ∈ D as well.
Denote by f(ht) the number of times along the finite history ht in which the history
ht′ belongs to H
∗ for t′ < t, that is,
f(ht) := #{0 ≤ t′ < t : ht′ ∈ H∗}.
For every finite history ht ∈ H, we denote the average payoff during the stages in which
the history was in H∗ by
αt :=
1
f(ht)
∑
0≤t′<t,ht′∈H∗
U(it′+1, jt′+1) =
1
f(ht)
∑
0≤t′<t,ht′∈H∗
U(s, jt′+1),
and the average payoff up to stage t during the stages in which the history was not in
H∗ by
βt :=
1
t− f(ht)
∑
0≤t′<t,ht′ 6∈H∗
U(it′+1, jt′+1).
Note that αt ∈ R1(s), so in particular d(αt, F \D) ≥ δ. Note also that
gt =
1
t
t∑
k=1
U(ik, jk) =
f(ht)
t
αt +
t− f(ht)
t
βt. (6)
The following result, which provides a uniform upper bound on f(ht), implies that
along the play, the safe action is played relatively rarely.
Lemma 7. For every ε > 0 there exists a constant c′ ∈ R+ such that for every strategy
τ of Player 2 we have
Pσ∗,τ
[
f(ht) ≤ c′
√
t
δ , ∀t ∈ N
]
≥ 1− ε.
To prove Lemma 7 we need the following technical result.
Lemma 8. For every x ∈ D, every y ∈ Rn, and every λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
d(λx+ (1− λ)y, F \D) ≥ λd(x, F \D)− (1− λ)d(y,D)
Proof. Step 1: Definitions.
Define two continuous functions g1, g2 : [0, 1]→ R by
g1(λ) := d(λx+ (1− λ)y, F \D), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1],
and
g2(λ) := λd(x, F \D)− (1− λ)d(y,D).
Since the set D is open, g1(1) = g2(1) = d(x, F \D) > 0. Define
λ0 := inf{λ ∈ [0, 1] : g1(λ) > 0}.
Step 2: The function g1 is concave on (λ0, 1].
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Figure 2: The construction in the proof of Lemma 8.
The claim holds since the set D is convex. Indeed, suppose that λ, λ′ ∈ (λ0, 1],
g1(λ) = c > 0, and g1(λ
′) = c′ > 0. This implies that d(λx + (1 − λ)y, F \ D) =
c and d(λ′x + (1 − λ′)y, F \ D) = c′. Consequently, B(λx + (1 − λ)y, c) ⊆ D and
B(λ′x + (1 − λ′)y, c′) ⊆ D, where B(z, r) is the open ball around z with radius r, for
every z ∈ Rn and every r ≥ 0. It follows that B(λ′′x + (1 − λ′′)y, c′′) ⊆ D, where
λ′′ := 12λ+
1
2λ
′ and c′′ := 12c+
1
2c
′. Therefore g1(λ′′) = d(λ′′x+ (1− λ′′)y, F \D) ≥ c′′.
The function g1 is therefore mid-point concave and continuous, hence concave.
Step 3: g2(λ) ≤ 0 for every λ ∈ [0, λ0).
The claim holds trivially whenever λ0 = 0. We therefore assume that λ0 > 0, so in
particular y is not in D. We will show that g2(λ0) ≤ 0. The result for every λ ∈ [0, λ0)
will follow since the function g2 is monotone increasing.
Set q := λ0x + (1 − λ0)y. Then q lies on the boundary of the set D. Denote by
z the unique closest point to y in D (see Figure 2; the uniqueness follows since D is
convex). Denote by θ the angle between the line segment [y, z] and the line segment
[y, x]. If θ > 0, denote by w the intersection point of the half line [z, q], and the
half line that starts at x, lies on the plane defined by x, y, and z, and has angle θ
relative to the line segment [x, y]. The triangles (x,w, q) and (y, z, q) are similar, hence
(1−λ0)d(y, z) = λ0d(x,w). If θ = 0, define w := z, and then (1−λ0)d(y, z) = λ0d(x,w)
holds as well. We conclude that
(1− λ0)d(y,D) = (1− λ0)d(y, z) = λ0d(x,w) ≥ λ0d(x, F \D),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that w is in F \D, because D is convex.
Consequently, g2(λ0) ≤ 0 as desired.
Step 4: g1(λ) ≥ g2(λ) for every λ ∈ [0, 1].
For λ ∈ [0, λ0) we have by Step 3
g1(λ) = 0 ≥ g2(λ).
By the continuity of g1 and g2 this inequality extends to λ = λ0. By Step 2 the function
g1 is concave on (λ0, 1] and by its definition the function g2 is linear on this interval.
Since g1(1) = g2(1) while g1(λ0) ≥ g2(λ0), it follows that g1(λ) ≥ g2(λ) for every
λ ∈ [λ0, 1].
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Proof of Lemma 7. It is sufficient to prove the claim for histories ht ∈ H that satisfy
f(ht) ≥ 2. Fix then ε > 0, a strategy τ of Player 2, and a finite history ht ∈ H that
satisfies f(ht) ≥ 2. Denote by m = m(ht) the last stage along ht such that hm ∈ H∗.
Note that if m < t then f(ht) = f(hm) + 1, while if m = t then f(ht) = f(hm). Since
hm ∈ H∗ we have d(gm, F \D) ≤ 3m . By Eq. (6) and Lemma 8 we deduce that
3
m ≥ d(gm, F \D)
= d
(
f(hm)
m αm +
m−f(hm)
m βm, F \D
)
≥ f(hm)m d(αm, F \D)− m−f(hm)m d(βm, D). (7)
Since αm ∈ R1(s) we have d(αm, F \ D) ≥ δ. Since βm is the average payoff when
playing the approachability strategy for m − f(hm) stages, there is a constant c ≥ 3,
such that2
Pσ∗,τ
[
βm ≤ c√
m−f(hm)
, ∀t ∈ N
]
≥ 1− ε. (8)
Together with Eq. (7) this implies that on the event
{
βm ≤ c√
m−f(hm)
, ∀t ∈ N
}
we
have
c
m ≥ 3m ≥ f(hm)m δ − m−f(hm)m · c√m−f(hm)
= f(hm)m δ −
c
√
m−f(hm)
m (9)
≥ f(hm)m δ − c
√
m
m , (10)
which solves to f(hm) ≤ c(1+
√
m)
δ . Consequently, on this event
f(ht) ≤ f(hm) + 1 ≤ c(1+
√
m)
δ + 1 ≤ c(2+
√
t)
δ ,
and the result follows.
We now complete the proof of Theorem 3 by showing that the strategy σ∗ approaches
the set A∩D, and, in particular, approaches the set A. This result holds since in most
stages Player 1 plays a strategy that approaches the set A ∩D.
Lemma 9. The strategy σ∗ approaches the set A ∩D.
Proof. Fix ε > 0. Since the strategy σ̂ approaches the set A ∩D, there is T0 ∈ N such
that for every strategy τ of Player 2,
Pσ̂,τ
[
d(gt, A ∩D) < ,∀t ≥ T0
]
> 1− . (11)
Consider an outside observer who wakes up at every stage t such that ht−1 6∈ H∗.
This observer is not aware of the stages t such that ht−1 ∈ H∗ and from his point of
view Player 1 follows the strategy σ̂. Let c′ be the constant of Lemma 7, and let T1 ∈ N
be sufficiently large so that T1 − c
′√T1
δ ≥ T0. By Lemma 7, with high probability the
number of stages which the observer missed up to stage T1 is at most
c′
√
T1
δ . Hence, up
to stage T1 of the actual game, with high probability the observer observed at least T0
stages.
2To properly interpret Eq. (8) and the event
{
βm ≤ c√
m−f(hm)
, ∀t ∈ N
}
, recall that m depends on t.
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Recall that βt is the average payoff up to stage t during the stages m in which the
partial history up to stage m is not in H∗; that is, this is the average payoff as observed
by the observer. Let Ω′ be the event that, for the observer, d(βt, A ∩D) ≤ ε for every
t ≥ T0:
Ω′ := {d(βt, A ∩D) ≤ ε, ∀t such that ht 6∈ H∗, t− f(ht) ≥ T0}.
By Eq. (11) we have Pσ∗,τ (Ω
′) > 1− ε.
Denote by Ω′′ the event
Ω′′ := Ω′ ∩
{
f(ht) ≤ c′
√
t
δ ,∀t ∈ N
}
.
By Lemma 7 we have Pσ∗,τ [Ω
′′] ≥ 1− 2ε.
From now on we restrict our attention to the event Ω′′ and we fix t ≥ T1. By
definition we have d(βt, A ∩ D) ≤ ε. Since payoffs are in between 0 and 1, we have
d(αt, A ∩D) ≤ 1, which implies that
d(gt, A ∩D) ≤ f(ht)t + t−f(ht)t d(βt, A ∩D) ≤ ε+ c
′
δ
√
t
. (12)
Taking T2 := max {T1, c′2ε2δ2 } we obtain that on Ω′′
d(gt, A ∩D) ≤ 2ε, ∀t ≥ T2,
and the desired result follows.
We now show that the rate of convergence to the target set A is not harmed by the
introduction of constraints. In particular, remaining in D as part of the approachability
strategy does not incur additional penalties on the rate of approachability from an
asymptotic perspective.
Lemma 10. The rate at which the strategy σ∗ approaches A ∩ D is O( 1
δ
√
t
); that is,
for every  > 0 there exists a constant c′′ > 0 such that for every strategy τ of Player 2
and every t ∈ N we have
Pσ?,τ
[
d(gt, A ∩D) < c
′′
√
t
]
≥ 1− .
Proof. We use the notations of Lemma 9. Fix ε > 0. Recall that βt is the average
payoff up to stage t in those stages in which the strategy σ∗ followed the strategy σ̂
that approaches A ∩D. Hence, there is c > 0 such that with probability at least 1− ε
we have d(βt, A ∩D) ≤ c√
t−f(ht)
for every t ∈ N and every strategy τ of Player 2 (see
Eq. (3)). By Eq. (12) and Lemma 7, with probability at least 1− ε we have
d(gt, A ∩D) ≤ t−f(ht)t d(βt, A ∩D) + f(ht)t
≤ c
√
t−f(ht)
t +
c′
√
t
δt (13)
≤ c√
t
+ c
′
δ
√
t
=
(
c+
c′
δ
)
1√
t
, (14)
and the claim follows.
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3 The Case that D is not Convex
The proof of Theorem 3 hinges on the assumption that the set D is convex. In this
section we study approachability with constraints when the set D is not convex. We
start with an example, which shows that in the absence of convexity, Conditions (C1)
and (C2) are not sufficient to guarantee that Player 1 can approach A while remaining
in D. This example will lead us to a weaker concept of approachability with constraints
that we will examine.
Example 11. Consider the game that appears in Figure 3, where Player 1 has four
actions, T1, T2, B1, and B2, Player 2 has two actions, L, and R, and the payoff is
two-dimensional.
L R
T1 (1, 2) (2, 2)
T2 (2, 2) (1, 2)
B1 (1, 1) (2, 1)
B2 (2, 1) (1, 1)
Figure 3: The payoff matrix in Example 11.
Let 0 < α′ < α < 12 and define A := B((
3
2 , 1), α
′) and D := ([1 − α, 2 + α] × [2 −
α, 2 + α] ∪ [ 32 − α, 32 + α]× [1− α, 2 + α]), see Figure 4.
A
D
1 2
1
2
Figure 4: The sets A and D in Example 11.
Conditions (C1) and (C2) are satisfied; indeed, the actions T1 and T2 are safe ac-
tions, and the strategy 12B1 +
1
2B2 approaches the set A, which is a strict subset of D,
and therefore it also approaches the set A ∩D.
Player 1 cannot approach A while remaining in D. Indeed, assume to the contrary
that Player 1 has a strategy σ that approaches A while remaining in D, and let τ be
the stationary strategy of Player 2 that plays L and R with equal probability at every
stage. Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small and suppose that the average payoff at stage t0 is in
the set B(A, ε). It might happen with positive probability, albeit small, that in the next
t0
ε stages the first coordinate of the outcome is 1. In this case there will be t > t0 such
that the average payoff at stage t is not in D.
Nevertheless, as we now argue, Player 1 can approach A while remaining in D with
high probability. To do so, Player 1 plays the mixed action 12T1 +
1
2T2 for K stages,
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where K ∈ N is sufficiently large, and afterwards he plays the mixed action 12B1 + 12B2.
During the first K stages the average payoff is in the convex hull of (1, 2) and (2, 2), and
in particular it remains in D. Moreover, by the strong law of large numbers, provided
K is sufficiently large, with high probability the first coordinate of the average payoff at
stage K is between 32− α2 and 32 + α2 . By the strong law of large numbers once again, and
provided K is sufficiently large, with high probability the first coordinate of the average
payoff at every stage t ≥ K is between 32 −α and 32 +α, in which case the average payoff
remains in D. It follows that Player 1 can indeed approach A while remaining in D
with high probability.
Example 11 leads us to the study of probabilistic approachability with constraints.
Definition 12. Let A and D be two subsets of Rn. Given ε > 0, we say that Player 1
can approach A while remaining in D with probability at least 1 − ε if there exist a
strategy σε and an integer Tε such that for every strategy τ of Player 2 we have:
P
[
d(gt, A) < ,∀t ≥ Tε
]
> 1− , (15)
P
[
d(gt, F \D) > 0,∀t ≥ 0
]
> 1− . (16)
We say that Player 1 can approach A while remaining in D with high probability if
for every  > 0 Player 1 can approach A while remaining in D with probability at least
1− ε.
To prove Theorem 3, which studied the case in which the set D is convex, we
constructed a strategy that “directly” approaches A ∩ D: the strategy attempted to
approach the set A∩D, and played a safe action only to ensure that the average payoff
does not leave D. In the next example we illustrate a more complex strategy that
handles the nonconvexity of the set D by setting intermediate goals to Player 1.
Example 13. Consider the game that appears in Figure 5, where Player 1 has four
actions, x0, x1, x2, and x3, Player 2 has two actions, L and R, and the payoff is
two-dimensional.
L R
x0 (1, 1) (1, 1)
x1 (4, 1) (4, 1)
x2 (2, 3) (4, 3)
x3 (4, 3) (2, 3)
Figure 5: The payoff matrix in Example 13.
Let 0 < α′ < α < 12 and define A := B((3, 3), α
′) and D := ([1 − α, 3 + α] × [1 −
α, 1 + α] ∪ [3− α, 3 + α]× [1− α, 3 + α]), see Figure 6.
To approach the set A while remaining in D with high probability, Player 1 can use
the following strategy.
• Play the action x0 during T0 stages, where T0 ∈ N is sufficiently large. Regardless
of the play of Player 2, the average payoff is gt = (1, 1) for every t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T0}.
• Between stages T0 + 1 and T0 +T1, play the action x1, where T1 = 3T0 Regardless
of the play of Player 2, we have gT0+T1 = (3, 1), and for every t ∈ {T0 + 1, T0 +
2, . . . , T0 + T1} the average payoffs gt is in the convex hull of (1, 1) and (3, 1),
hence in D.
• Then play forever the mixed action [ 12 (x2), 12 (x3)], which approaches the set A.
12
A1 3 5
1
3
5
Figure 6: The sets A and D in Example 13.
By the strong law of large numbers, the probability that the average payoff always remains
in D goes to 1 as T0 goes to infinity. Indeed, the average payoff will leave the set D
only if in the last phase of the play, the percentage of the number of stages in which the
outcome is (2, 3) is far from 0.5, an event which occurs with a small probability when
T0 is sufficiently large.
While the strategy used in the proof of Theorem 3 plays either the safe action or
a strategy that approaches the set A ∩ D, the strategy used in Example 13 starts by
playing a sequence of actions that lead the average payoff towards the intermediate
target (3, 1), and then a sequence of actions that lead the average payoff towards A∩D.
There are two main differences between the two strategies.
• First, since in Theorem 3 the set D is convex, the convex hull of R1(s) and any
point gt ∈ D is a subset of D, hence Player 1 can switch from playing the safe
action s to a strategy that approaches A ∩ D, back and forth, to maintain the
average payoff in D. When the set D is not convex, one needs to “lead” the
average payoff from R1(s) to some point x that satisfies that the convex hull of x
and a subset of A ∩D remains in D, and once the average payoff gets close to x,
switch to the strategy that approaches A∩D. Thus, the play before switching to
the strategy that approaches A∩D is more involved when the set D is not convex.
• Second, the convexity of the set D in Theorem 3 ensures that whenever the average
payoff gets close to F \D and the strategy plays the safe action again, the average
payoff, which is the average of two vectors in D, is in D. When the set D is not
convex, this property does not hold, and it may be impossible to play the safe
action, in a way that ensures that the average payoff remains in D. Hence in this
case we have to work with the weaker concept of Definition 12.
The discussion above leads us to the following sufficient condition for a pair of
set (A,D) to be such that Player 1 can approach A while remaining in D with high
probability. A mixed action of Player 1 is called safe if each action in the support of
the mixed action is safe.
Theorem 14. Let A and D be two subsets of Rn, the latter being open. Suppose that
(D1) The set A ∩D is approachable.
(D2) There exist δ > 0, a safe mixed-action x0, m mixed actions x1, . . . , xm ∈ ∆(I),
and m open subsets A1, . . . , Am of Rn such that Am ⊆ A ∩D. Set A0 := R1(x0),
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and assume that for every 0 ≤ ` ≤ m− 1 the following hold:
conv[A` ∪B(R1(x`+1), δ)] \A`+1 is not path-connected, and (17)
conv[A` ∪B(A`+1, δ)] ⊆ D. (18)
Then Player 1 can approach A while remaining in D with probability 1 − , for every
 > 0.
Proof. The proof is quite technical, yet it poses no conceptual difficulties. We therefore
only present the main steps of the proof.
Eq. (17) implies that every path in conv[A` ∪ R1(x`+1)] that links A` to R1(x`+1)
intersects A`+1. Moreover, because A`+1 is open while A` and R1(x`+1) are closed, the
length of this intersection is bounded away from 0. Denote by Λ` > 0 a lower bound on
the length of these intersections and define
Λ := min
0≤`≤m−1
Λ` > 0.
Fix ε > 0 and let T such that T  1Λ . Define a collection τ0, τ1, · · · , τm−1 of stopping
times as follows:
τ0 := T, (19)
τ` := min{t > τ`−1 : gt ∈ A`}, ` ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m− 1}. (20)
Define a strategy σ(T ) as follows:
• Until stage τ0 play the safe mixed-action x0.
• Between stages τ`−1 and τ`−1 play the mixed action x`, for each ` ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m−
1}.
• From stage τm−1 and onward play a strategy σ̂ that approaches the set A ∩D.
Let T0 be sufficiently large. We argue that if Player 1 plays the strategy σ(T0), then
with high probability
• The stopping times τ1, · · · , τm−1 are bounded, regardless of the strategy played
by Player 2.
• The average payoff remains in D.
Indeed, by the strong law of large numbers, provided T0 is sufficiently large, we have
Pσ(T0),τ [τ0 ≤ T0] > 1− ε, for every strategy τ of Player 2. Moreover, since x0 is a safe
mixed action, gt ∈ D for every t ≤ τ0.
Assume by induction that, for a given ` ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m− 2}, there is an integer T`−1
such that Pσ(T ),τ [τ`−1 ≤ T`−1] > 1−`ε. In particular, gτ`−1 ∈ A`−1 on the event {τ`−1 ≤
T`−1}. At stage τ`−1 Player 1 starts playing the mixed action x`, so the expected stage
payoff is in R1(x`). The sequence of the average payoffs (gt)
τ`
t=τ`−1 starts at A`−1 and
moves towards R1(x`). Since τ`−1 ≥ τ0 = T0, we have ‖gt − gt−1‖ < 2T0 < Λ. By the
strong law of large numbers, provided T0 is much larger than
1
Λ , there is T` ≥ T`−1 such
that gt ∈ A` for some t ≤ T`, and therefore τ` is finite. Moreover, Eq. (18) implies that
provided T0 is sufficiently large, Pσ(T0),τ [τ` ≤ T`] > 1− (`+ 1)ε, for every strategy τ of
Player 2.
Since at stage τm−1 Player 1 starts following a strategy that approaches the set A∩D,
there is an integer Tm such that Pσ(T0),τ [d(gt, A ∩D) ≤ ε, ∀t ≥ τm] > 1 − (m + 2)ε.
Eq. (18), applied to ` = m, implies that, provided T0 is sufficiently large, with high
probability gt ∈ D for every t ≥ τm. The result follows.
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The next example shows that the sufficient condition provided by Theorem 14 is not
necessary.
Example 15. Consider the game that appears in Figure 7, where Player 1 has three
actions, T1, T2, and B, Player 2 has two actions, L and R, and the payoff is two-
dimensional.
L R
T1 (1, 2) (1, 2)
T2 (2, 1) (2, 1)
B (2, 3) (3, 2)
Figure 7: The payoff matrix in Example 15.
Let 0 < α′ < α < 12 and define A := {(2, 2)} and D := ([2− α, 2 + α]× [2− α, 3 +
α] ∪ [2− α, 3 + α]× [2− α, 2 + α]), see Figure 8.
A
1 2 3
1
2
3
Figure 8: The sets A and D in Example 15.
In this game, B is the only safe action of Player 1, yet R1(B) 6⊂ D, and therefore
Eq. (18) is not satisfied for ` = 0. Nevertheless, Player 1 can approach A while remain-
ing in D. To do that, Player 1 plays in blocks of size 2. In the first stage of each block
Player 1 plays the action B. If Player 2 played the action L (resp. R) at the first stage
of the block, then in the second stage of the block Player 1 plays the action T2 (resp.
T1). The average payoff in each block is (2, 2). The reader can verify that the strategy
described above ensures that the average payoff converges to (2, 2) while remaining in
D.
4 Open Problems
We end the paper by mentioning two open problems. Theorem 14 provides a sufficient
condition for approachability with constraints in the nonconvex case. A natural question
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is whether one can find a necessary and sufficient condition for approachability with
constraints in this case. As the examples shows, a complete characterization may require
handling many different cases and be quite technical.
Another issue, that already arises in the setup of approachability without constraints,
is what happens when Player 2 (nature) cannot play any mixed action, but is restricted
to a subset of mixed actions. This happens, e.g., when Player 2 is composed of two
players who cannot correlate their actions. Can one find out how the collection of sets
that are approachable when Player 2 changes as the set of mixed action available to
Player 2 varies?
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